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Abstract 
         The development of wireless sensor devices in 
terms of low power and inexpensive data-relaying has 
been partially achieved because of the rapid progress 
in integrated circuits and radio transceiver designs and 
device technology. Due to these achievements, the 
wireless sensor devices are able to gather information, 
process them if required, and send them to the next 
sensor device.  In some applications, these wireless 
sensor devices must be secured, especially when the 
captured information is valuable, sensitive or for 
military usage. Wormhole attacks are a significant 
type of security attacks which can damage the 
wireless sensor networks if they go undetected. 
Unfortunately, these attacks are still possible, even if 
the communication is secured. The wormhole attack 
records packets at one point of the network, passes 
them into another node and this last node injects the 
packet into the wireless sensor network again. This 
type of attacks can not be avoided by using 
cryptographic techniques because attackers neither 
generate new nor alter existing packets. They only 
forward legitimate packets from part of the network 
to another part. This attack can cause damage to the 
route discovery mechanism used in many routing 
schemes. In this paper we build an actual test bed, 
which is called BANAID, to simulate the wormhole 
attack on a wireless sensor network and then 
implement one of the current solutions against this 
attack. BANAID consists of a combination of Mica2 
motes and Stargate sensor devices. 
 
1. Introduction 
         The capability of combining sensing, processing, 
and communicating wirelessly have been enabled by 
the advances in microelectronics fabrication [2]. A 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is composed of a 
group of tiny sensor devices, which can be networked 
together and deployed in a wide spectrum of 
applications in various military and civil domains. The 
main objectives of deploying the Wireless Sensor 
Network (WSNs) are remote monitoring and gathering 
information [2]. Most of WSN’s applications run in 
non-trusted environments and require secure 
communications such as emergency response 
operations, military or police networks, and safety-
critical business operations. For example, in 
emergency response operations such as after a 
natural disaster like flood, tornado, or earthquake, a 
wireless sensor network could be used for real time 
feedback. So, emergency rescue will relay on that 
particular type of networks [3].  
 
Unfortunately, this type of network is vulnerable to 
several attacks. One major type of these attacks is 
known as a Wormhole attack where an attacker 
records a packet at one location in the network, 
tunnels the packet to another location, and replays it 
at other part of the network [3]. The wormhole attack 
places the attacker in a very powerful position, 
allowing him to gain unauthorized access, disrupt 
routing, or perform a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
[3].  Current solutions for Wormhole attack such as [4, 
9,10] are evaluated by running the proposed 
techniques in different simulations.  There is no real 
deployment for any of these solutions.  To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first work that built an 
actual test bed to show the visibility of the Wormhole 
attack in WSN.  BANAID consists of few numbers of 
Mica2 [1] and two Stargate [2] sensor devices. 
Moreover, one of the proposed solutions, which is 
Packet Leashes [4], will be implemented. 
 
 
Figure 1: MICA2 Motes without an antenna [1]. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, an introduction about different components 
used in building up BANAID will be given. Section 3 
describes the designing and the implementation of 
BANAID. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. BANAID Components 
        It is important to have some background about 
the wireless sensor devices used in this paper to build 
up the test bed. BANAID consists of several Mica2 
motes and two Stargate sensor devices. In the 
following subsections, brief information about these 
two types of wireless devices is given. 
 
 
2.1 MICA2  
       There are different models of Motes that have 
been produced by Crossbow
1
. Each of these models 
has different features. These models are MICAz, 
MICA2, MICA2DOT, and MICA. All models except 
MICA2 are beyond the scope of this paper. MICA2 
Motes have been used in this paper to build BANAID. 
Therefore, the features, hardware layouts, and 
software environment of MICA2 Motes are described 
in the following subsections. 
 
2.1.1 MICA2 Features 
         The MICA2 Motes come in three types according 
to their RF frequency band: the MPR400 (915 MHz), 
MPR410 (433 MHz), and MPR420 (315 MHz). The 
Motes use the Chipcon CC1000, FSK modulated radio. 
All types utilize a powerful Atmega128L micro-
controller and a frequency tunable radio with 
extended range. The MPR4x0 and MPR5x0 radios are 
compatible and can communicate with each other. 
(The x = 0, 1, or 2 depending on the type / frequency  
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Figure 2: MIB510 Serial Interface Board [1]. 
 
band) [1]. Figure 1 shows a sample of MICA2 Mote.  
The current version of Mica2 uses a 16 bit, 8MHz 
Texas Instruments, 1024 KB external flash, and is 
powered by two AA batteries. 
 
2.1.2 Hardware Layout 
         The MICA2 Mote can be reprogrammed using an 
external board called MIB510 Serial Interface Board. 
This board is a multi-purpose interface board used 
with MICA, MICA2, MICAz, and MICA2DOT Motes 
family. It supplies power to the devices through an 
external power adapter option, and provides an 
interface for a RS-232 Mote serial port and 
reprogramming port [4].  The MIB510 serial interface 
board, as shown in Figure 2, is used to program the 
MICA2 Mote. This board has the PC connection 
capability using the RS-232 serial port. Programming 
the Motes requires a special operating system called 
TinyOS, which should be installed in the PC.  
 
 
2.1.3 Software Environment 
         MICA2 Motes uses a special operating system, 
which is used for wireless sensor nodes, called TinyOS 
[7]. This operating system is an open-source event-
driven operating system designed for wireless 
embedded sensor networks. It features a component-
based architecture which enables rapid innovation 
and implementation while minimizing code size as 
required by the severe memory constraints inherent 
in sensor networks. TinyOS's component library 
includes network protocols, distributed services, 
sensor drivers, and data acquisition tools – all of which 
can be used as-is or can be further refined for a 
custom application. TinyOS's event-driven execution 
model enables fine-grained power management, yet 
allows the scheduling flexibility made necessary by the 
unpredictable nature of wireless communication and 
physical world interfaces [1].  
 Figure 3: Processor Board (Top View)[2]. 
 
TinyOS have been implemented in a language called 
nesC. This language is an extension to C which has 
been designed to embody the structuring concepts 
and execution model of TinyOS. Programs written in 
nesC language are built out of components, which are 
wired to form entire programs. Each component has 
interfaces which can provide its functionality to other 
users.   
 
2.2 Stargate 
         Stargate is a powerful single board computer 
with enhanced communications and sensor signal 
processing capabilities. This product was designed 
within Intel’s Ubiquitous Computing Research 
Program, and licensed to Crossbow for production. In 
addition to traditional single board computer 
applications, the Stargate directly supports 
applications around Intel’s Open-Source Robotics 
initiative as well as TinyOS based Wireless Sensor 
Networks.  
 
2.2.1 Stargate Features 
         Stargate uses Intel’s latest generation 400 MHz 
XScale processor (PXA255) and SA1111 StrongARM 
companion chip for I/O access. It has a reset button, 
real time clock, lithium ion battery option and 51-pin 
daughter card interface [2]. The Stargate sensor 
device used in this test bed has various features which 
can also be used in different applications.  The main 
feature that has been used extensively in the test bed 
is the Compact Flash slot. Stargate has the capability 
to have a WiFi Compact Flash card. Another expansion 
in Stargate is MICA2 Mote connector, which allows 
the Stargate to communicate with other MICA2 Motes 
through the radio channel. Stargate consists of two 
hardware pieces: the processor board and the 
daughter card. These pieces will be explained in 
details in the following subsection 
 
Figure 4: Processor Board (Bottom View) [2]. 
 
2.2.2 Hardware Layout 
 
      As mentioned in the previously, Stargate consists 
of two hardware pieces: a processor board and a 
daughter board. Each of these pieces will be described 
in this subsection. The processing board as appeared 
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows all the main buttons 
and slots. Figure 3 shows the top view of the 
processing board. It is clear from this view that  
 
Stargate has two slots. These slots can be used to 
communicate with other devices. The first slot is used 
to allow Stargate to communicate with other MICA2 
Mote by connecting a MICA2 Mote over the Stargate. 
The second slot is used to connect WiFi Compact Flash 
card to the Stargate, which allow it to communicate 
through the standard 802.11a or 802.11b wireless 
protocols.   
 
Figure 5: Daughter Card (Top View) [2]. 
The processor board gets its power from the daughter 
card. The daughter card has a power supply jack as it 
appears in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Also, the daughter 
card allows the user to communicate with Stargate 
using different types of interfaces. There are three 
different ways to communicate with Stargate. The first 
one is using Serial RS232 Connecter.  
 
Figure 6: Daughter Card (Bottom View) [2]. 
 
The second is using RJ-45 Ethernet Port. And the third 
one is using USB Port. All these interfaces give the 
ability to control or upload programs to the Stargate.  
All switch buttons in the Stargate processor board and 
daughter card have to be switched on before using 
Stargate. There are two switch buttons S1 and S2 in 
the processor board. The third switch button S3 is 
located in the daughter card.  
       
2.2.3 Software Environment 
         As mentioned before, the Stargate is using an 
embedded Linux operating system kernel. It is 
installed on the processing board of the Stargate. 
There is also additional software shipped with the 
Stargate development platform, which could be used 
to enable program development. The Stargate’s 
platform provides the capability of installing programs 
written in C language. The developer can control 
various functions in Stargate by using C language 
programs after compiling and installing them.   
 
3. Building BANAID 
         In this section the design, implementation, 
explanation of the wormhole attack, and the 
implementation of its solution will be described.  
 
3.1 Design of BANAID 
        The proposed test bed is developed with the 
following underlying assumptions: 
• The chosen network topology is assumed to 
be fixed. 
• Each node is assumed to know its neighbors.  
Figure 7 shows that BANAID is composed of seven 
Mica2 sensor nodes and two Stargate devices. In this 
network design, the original source is Mote 1 and the 
original destination is Mote 4. The global clock is a 
normal sensor (Mote) which keeps sending a clock 
packet to synchronize all other motes.   
 
Figure 7: The proposed design of BANAID. 
       
Each Mote in each Stargate will only forward any 
received message from radio connection to WiFi 
connection and vice versa without changing these 
messages. The routing algorithm that has been used in 
BANAID is the Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV). This routing algorithm will be explained in the 
next subsection.  
 
Moreover, the wormhole attack happens during the 
phase of building the routes between nodes in AODV. 
The attack will affect the routing table entries in the 
original source and destination motes. Therefore, the 
actual path that a message should pass from the 
original source to the original destination will be 
imprecise. The impact of the wormhole attack on the 
network will appear clearly in both the original source 
and the original destination motes. The original source 
mote will deal with the original destination mote as its 
direct neighbor and vice versa, which is not right 
because they are separated by two intermediate 
motes. 
 
3.2 The AODV Algorithm 
         The Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
routing algorithm is a routing protocol designed for ad 
hoc mobile networks. It is an on demand algorithm, 
meaning that it builds routes between nodes only as 
desired by source nodes. It maintains these routes as 
long as they are needed by the sources. 
 
AODV builds routes using route request and reply 
query messages. When a source node desires a route 
to a destination for which it does not already have a 
route, it broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet 
across the network. Nodes receiving this packet 
update their information for the source node and set 
up backwards pointers to the source node in the route 
tables. A node receiving the RREQ may send a route 
reply (RREP) if it is either the destination or if it has a 
route to the destination and the sequence number in 
RREQ packet is not present in the node. If this is the 
case, it sends a RREP back to the source. Otherwise, it 
forwards the RREQ. Nodes keep track of the RREQ's 
packets by storing their sequence numbers. If they 
receive a RREQ which they have already processed, 
they discard the RREQ and do not forward it. 
 
As the RREP propagates back to the source nodes set 
up forward pointers to the destination. Once the 
source node receives the RREP, it may begin to 
forward data packets to the destination. The routing 
table for each node will be updated according to the 
hop count field in RREQ or RREP packets. The received 
packet with the smallest hop count will be chosen as 
the best route path. 
 
However, in this paper, not all of AODV routing 
algorithm features have been implemented, features 
that meet the aim of this paper are just implemented 
for the sake of simplicity. For example, features like 
sending and receiving RREQ/RREP packets, and 
building the routing tables for each node have been 
implemented whereas features like maintaining the 
route paths and sending hello messages have not 
been implemented.  
 
3.3 Implementation of BANAID 
         According to the proposed design of BANAID, 
there are seven MICA2 Motes and two Stargate sensor 
devices. Two motes have been combined with the two 
Stargate sensor devices which are mote 5 and mote 6.  
 
To implement BANAID, three types of programs have 
been written and installed in the motes and the 
stargate sensor devices. The first program has been 
installed in motes 1, 2, 3, and 4, which is a simple 
customized AODV algorithm. The second program has 
been installed in motes 5 and 6, which forwards any 
received packet from the radio antenna to the serial 
port that connects the mote with the Stargate and 
vice versa, without changing this packet. The third 
program has been installed in both Stargate 1 and 2. 
When a packet is received by the Stargate from its 
serial port, which is connected to the corresponding 
mote, the program forwards it to the other Stargate 
through its WiFi connection and vice versa. The other 
Stargate will receive this packet from its WiFi 
connection and forward it to its serial port, which is 
also connected to the corresponding mote. Then this 
packet will be broadcasted via the radio antenna of 
the mote.  
 
3.3.1 The AODV Program 
         Before describing the functionalities that are 
done by this program, a brief explanation about the 
important variables is given as follows: 
 
 
OS OD C N HC MID MT S/M TS 
Table 1: Packet Format. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the packet format used in building 
this test bed where 
• OS represents original sender address. 
• OD represents original destination address. 
• C represents the current sensor address. 
• N represents the next sensor’s address. 
• HC represents the hop counter. 
• MID represents the messages ID. 
• MT represents the message type. 
• S/M explains whether the message comes 
from a Stargate or a Mica2 sensor. 
• TS represent time stamp.  
 
Dest. Address Next Hop Hop Count 
…   
Table 2: Routing Table Format. 
 
Next, Table 2 describes the routing table format. It is a 
k*3 array where k is a predefined value that 
represents the maximum number of entries that the 
routing table can hold.  The table consists of three 
fields: the destination address field which stores the 
final destination for the current received packet, the 
next hop field which holds the address for next hop, 
and the hop count field which represents the number 
of hops left before reaching the final destination. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the pseudo code
2
 that has been 
used in this paper to implement AODV. It describes 
the AODV’s functionalities that have been 
implemented in order to build this test bed.  It does 
the most important part of this paper since it 
implements the AODV routing algorithm, synchronizes 
with global clock, and implements the a solution to 
the wormhole attack. This program has been written 
in combination of nesC and C languages and will be 
upload into Mote 1,2,3, and 4.  
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  The whole program can be obtained by contacting 
the first author. 
Figure 8: Pseudo Code of AODV. 
 
3.3.2 TOSBase Program 
         This program was written and delivered with the 
TinyOS tool kit as one of many readymade 
applications.  The name of this application is TOSBase, 
which can be found under the application directory in 
TinyOS file. It simply forwards any received packet 
from the radio antenna of the Mica2 sensor to the 
serial port (51-pin Hirose Connector), which is shown 
in Figure 1, without changing the content of the 
packet. The Mica2 sensor is connected to the Stargate 
through this serial port. This program is written in 
nesC language and will be uploaded into Mote 5, and 
6 (see Figure 7).  
 
3.3.3 Stargate Program 
         The program consists of two threads or 
processes
3
. The first process is the main program, 
which keeps listening to the serial port connected to 
the mote and sends any received packet to the client 
socket.   
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 The whole program can be obtained by contacting 
the first author. 
 
Figure 9: Pseudo Code of Stargate’s Program 
 
The client socket will initiate a WiFi connection with 
the server socket in the other Stargate. The second 
thread or process runs as a server that keeps listening 
to any client connection via WiFi. It receives the 
packet and forwards it to the serial port connected to 
the mote, which will broadcast the packet via its radio 
antenna. As explained in Figure 9, the program in 
Stargate 1 will only forward messages from radio that 
comes from the original source which is mote 1. The 
other Stargate 2 will only forward messages from 
radio that comes from the original destination mote 4. 
The two versions of these programs are the same 
except in checking the type of the message before 
start forwarding it.  
 
3.4 Demonstration of BANAID 
         This subsection illustrates the usability of this test 
bed. The Mica2 Motes have some indicators which 
have been used to simulate this type of attack. Each 
mote has three lights: red, green, and yellow. These 
lights have been used in this paper to simplify the 
demonstration of this solution such as showing how 
packets are traveling from one mote to another and 
showing when and how the wormhole attack 
happens. For example when the green light blinks, it 
means that the mote is sending a packet. The red light 
indicates that the mote has received a RREQ packet 
from other motes. The yellow light turns on when the 
mote has received a RREP packet from other motes. 
The green and yellow lights together indicate that a 
RREQ or RREP has been received at the destination. It 
is clear to say that the red light will be seen before the 
yellow light since the request packet comes before the 
reply. However, if the yellow light has been seen 
before the green light, it means a wormhole attack 
has been detected. The reason for this is the replay 
comes before or faster than the request packet. By 
doing this, it is easier now to understand what is 
happening during the demonstration.  
 
 
3.5 Visibility of BANAID 
 
There are two situations to run BANAID. The first 
situation is demonstrating the customized AODV 
routing algorithm without implementing the 
wormhole attacks. In other words, demonstrating 
customized AODV without the Stargate sensor 
devices. The second situation is demonstrating 
wormhole attack beside the customized AODV.  
 
To demonstrate the first situation, it is important to 
turn the Stargate sensor devices off. The wormhole 
attack will not occur in this situation. To start this 
demonstration, firstly turn on motes 2, 3, 4, and 7. 
Then, turn on the mote 1 which acts as the original 
source. Mote 1 will start sending RREQ packet by 
blinking its green light. This sending will be after 
synchronized with global clock. Mote 2 will receive the 
RREQ packet, turn on its red light, and forward this 
packet by blinking its green light. Mote 3 will do the 
same thing that mote 2 has done. Finally, mote 4 will 
receive the RREQ packet, turn on its red light and 
yellow light indicating that the RREQ has reached its 
destination, and prepare the RREP packet. The same 
process will happen for RREP packet, but the 
difference is that each mote will turn on its yellow 
light on receiving the RREP packet. Finally, Mote 4 will 
turn on its red and yellow lights on receiving the RREP 
packet indicating that the RREP has reached its 
destination. 
 
The other situation is demonstrating the wormhole 
attack by adding the two Stargate with their motes. 
Firstly, turn on all motes and Stargates except mote 1 
which is the original source. Then, turn on mote 1 to 
start sending the RREQ packet. In this situation, mote 
4 which is the original destination will receive the 
RREQ from mote 1 directly through the Stargate path 
since the WiFi path is faster than the radio path. This 
happens when Mote 5 receives the RREQ packet from 
mote 1 and sends it directly through the WiFi 
connection to the other Stargate. Mote 6 in the other 
Stargate will send this packet to mote 4 via its radio 
antenna. The RREQ packet will travel through the WiFi 
connection faster than the normal path which is 
through the intermediate motes 2 and 3. In this 
situation, mote 4 will think that mote 1 is its direct 
neighbor and it will turn on its red light and yellow 
light preparing for the RREP packet. Mote 4 will send 
the RREP packet which will be delivered through the 
WiFi connection between the two Stargates. Mote 1 
will turn on its red and yellow lights when it receives 
the RREP packet. Also, mote 1 will think that mote 4 is 
its direct neighbor and this is how the wormhole 
attack happens. It is possible to display the 
information of the packets and the final routing table 
in mote 1 by using a PC. More details of how to 
perform that have been provided in Chapter 3.  
 
There are a number of techniques to solve the 
wormhole attack in a wireless sensor network. In the 
next section, some of these techniques will be briefly 
described. The implementation of one of them will be 
explained in section 3.7. 
 
3.6 Wormhole Attack Solution 
 
       To detect and deter the Wormhole attack, some 
solutions have been proposed in different papers such 
as [4,9,10]. Hu et al. proposed a defense against the 
Wormhole attacks in WSN called packet leashes [4].  It 
is the most commonly cited solution and therefore it 
is the only solution that is implemented in this paper. 
A leash is a portion of information that is added to the 
packet to restrict its traveling distance or time. This 
solution consists of two types of leashes: geographic 
leashes and temporal leashes. Each of these types will 
be described briefly in this section and more details 
are available in [4].  
 
A geographic leash detects and prevents the 
wormhole attack by ensuring that the sender and the 
receiver are within a specified distance. To do that, 
each node must know its location and be timely 
synchronized with other nodes. The other type of 
solution is a temporal leash. It detects and prevents 
the wormhole attack by ensuring that the packet’s 
traveling time is within a specified period of time. To 
do that, all nodes must be timely synchronized in 
terms of their clocks. When the sender starts sending 
the packets, it stores its sending timestamp in the 
packet. Then, the receiver can compare its receiving 
timestamp with the value in the packet. Therefore, 
the receiver will be able to detect if the packet 
traveled so fast according to a specified transmission 
time. In BANAID, the temporal leash solution has been 
used and implemented to detect and prevent the 
wormhole attack in the wireless sensor network. The 
geographic leash solution has not been considered in 
this paper because it is complicated to be 
implemented. It needs a special hardware that can 
specify the locations of all nodes such as GPS, which is 
expensive.   
 
3.7 Implementation of the 'Packet Leashes  
       Solutions' 
 
       As it has been discussed earlier, timing mechanism 
is required to distinguish if the packet received from 
the fake path or the real path to avoid the wormhole 
attack. A packet received from the Stargate is going to 
be faster than the packet received from the mote 
since the WiFi transmission is faster than the radio 
transmission. Therefore, applying this timing 
mechanism will allow the destination to recognize the 
real packet by comparing it’s time stamp with the time 
stamp of the received packet. If the difference 
between these two time stamps is less than or equal 
to X, it means that it is a fake packet. To compute the 
value of X according to BANAID design: 
• There is a transmission delay in each mote. 
The average transmission delay is around 45 
msec( Tr = 45 msec ).[5]. 
• The real path consists of mote 1, 2, 3, and 4 
where the fake path consists of mote1, 5, 6, 
and 4.  
• Processing time at each mote will be 
neglected since both paths have the same 
number of motes. Therefore, the total 
processing time for motes in each path will 
be almost same. 
• The WiFi transmission delay is neglected 
since the data rate is high. 
 
Delay on the real path: 
  = No. of motes that will transmit * Tr 
  = 3 (mote1, 2, and 3) * 45  
  = 3 Tr. 
 
Delay on the fake path: 
  = No. of motes that will do transmission * Tr 
  = 2 (mote1, and 6) * 45  
  = 2 Tr. 
Therefore, the destination node is able to distinguish 
between the real and the fake packet by subtracting 
the time stamp at destination by the time stamp at 
the source. If the result <= 2 Tr, then the packet is 
fake. Otherwise, it is real.  
 
4. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
       The rapid development in the wireless sensor 
networks field has allowed this technology to be used 
in many applications. Some of these applications are 
critical and require secure and trusted environment. 
Therefore, different research studies have been 
conducted to analyze the wireless sensor networks 
and discovering their threats. One of the attacks 
which may damage wireless sensor networks is the 
Wormhole attack. Thus, this paper built a test bed of a 
group of sensor devices to simulate the wormhole 
attack and implement one of the solutions to detect 
and prevent this attack. In this paper, a brief 
background about the types of wireless devices, which 
are used in building up BANAID, is introduced. Then, 
the design and the implementation of BANAID are 
illustrated by describing the proposed network 
topology, the algorithms, and the chosen solution. 
Finally, detailed steps of setting up BANAID are given. 
In future, the timing mechanism that has been used 
might be improved especially with the new version of 
TinyOS that give the opportunity to implement 
internal clock in the mote. Also, BANAID could be 
enhanced by some additional improvements such as 
implementing and evaluating different solutions for 
the Wormhole attack, and extending the size of the 
size of the network implemented in BANAID.   
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